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CHOICE OF LAW
BASED ON THE SEAT OF THE RELATIONSHIP
BY JACK DAVIES* AND STEPHEN R. RATHKE**
In 1869 the German jurist I. C. von Savigny wrote of choice
of law: "the whole problem comes to be -To discover for every
legal relationship (case) that legal territory to which, in its proper
nature, it belongs or is subject (in which it has its seat)."'
During the choice of law revolution of the 1960's a similar
analysis was used to solve conflict-of-laws problems in the famous
case of Dym v. Gordon.2 Although both parties were domiciled
in New York, and the auto was registered and insured in New
York, a four-judge majority of the New York Court of Appeals
applied the Colorado guest statute in a lawsuit which arose
out of a Colorado accident. The court found the legal relationship
of guest-passenger to host-driver decisive: "Since the relationship
itself is the reason for the special treatment, we conclude that the
jurisdiction where the relationship was seated had the primary in-
terest in having its laws applied."3
This is not much authority for a seat of the relationship
approach, especially since the Savigny theme is treated as worthy of
only a one-sentence synopsis in most conflict texts; the rationale
of Dym was abandoned by the very court which rendered the de-
cision.' Nonetheless, the objective of this article is to establish
that seat of the relationship should be the basic tool with which to
salve choice-of-law problems. To achieve this objective, the article
will reassert the preeminence of territorial sovereignty in conflict
of laws ;5 it will then show the utility of solving choice-of-law prob-
lems by correlating the legal relationships with both territoriality
* Professor at Law, William Mitchell College of Law; State Senator, State
of Minnesota.
** Member of the Minnesota bar.
1. I. VON SAVIGNY, THE CONFLICT Op LAws 133 (2d ed. W. Guthree
transl. 1880) (emphasis in original).
2. 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965).
3. Id. at 126, 209 N.E.2d at 795, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 467.
4. See Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519
(1969).
5. See generally RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) and note 9
infra..
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and the new concept of "governmental interest" which dominates
current choice-of-law thought.6
Issue-by-Issue Choice of Law
Before the compatibility of the governmental interest prin-
ciple and territoriality can be more fully discussed, it is neces-
sary to focus on a profound modern change in conflict of laws.
Formerly the law applicable to a case was selected all at once from
one jurisdiction. Now choice of law is made issue-by-issue. When
the issues of an interstate case involve a number of rules of law,
the choice-of-law process must choose not between jurisdiction A
and jurisdiction B, but rather between legal rules A1 and B1 , A2
and B2, As and B 3 and so forth.7 This change has opened the field
of choice of law to precise analysis and to an accurate and logical
theory. Past efforts to determine all choices of law in a case by a
single spin of the wheel frustrated rational analysis of actual
cases. It also prevented development of a coherent theory for
choice of law. We now know that choice-of-law issues can be
solved only through an understanding of the separate, fundamental
factors involved in each issue. The value of the issue-by-issue choice
of law is that choices can be made considering both the policy ob-
jectives of the specific rules in conflict (the governmental interest
behind each rule) and the geographic facts of the case which are
relevant to each issue.
Territorial Imperative
Governmental interest analysis and territoriality have been
described as contradictory and incompatible.' But the division of
6. See B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963)
[hereinafter cited as B. CURRIE]; A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 347-53
(1962) [hereinafter cited as A. EHRENZWEIG]; R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY
ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 407 (1971) [hereinafter cited as R. WEINTRAUB];
Cavers, Cheatham, Currie, Ehrenzweig, Leflar, Reese, Comments on Bab-
cock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict of Laws, 63 COLUM. L. REv.
1212 (1963).
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188(2) (1971) provides:
"These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with
respect to the particular issue." See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT
OF LAWS § 145.
8. Typical are comments by Professors Robert Sedler and Albert Ehren-
zweig. "In Neumeier ... the court retreated considerably back to territorial-
ism. It changed its approach to one of 'narrow choice of law rules,' which
were based only in part upon interest analysis and in which considerations of
territoriality . . . predominated." Sedler, Interstate Accidents and the Unpro-
vided For Case: Reflections on Neumeier v. Kuehner, 1 HOFSTRA L. REv. 125,
[Vol. 10
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the world into sovereign or semi-sovereign legal territories creates
conflict of laws. Without territoriality the problems of choice of
law would be nonexistent.' The recently identified governmental
interest principle of conflict of law itself arises out of the sov-
ereignty of territorial jurisdictions. Territoriality is the essence of
the modern governmental interest focus in the choice of law.
The traditional approach to choice-of-law issues is charac-
terized by Professors Roger Cramton, David Currie and Herma
Hill Kay in their conflicts casebook as the need to locate "terri-
torially the relevant event or thing."1 The traditional territorial-
131 (1973). "Yet while quite acceptable in a field like enterprise tort law which
resists a more 'functional' regime, this territorial approach, if generally taken,
would indeed mean turning back the clock." Ehrenzweig, A Counter-Revplu-
tion in Conflicts Law: From Beale to Cavers, 80 HARV. L. REv. 377, 400
(1966). See note 6 supra.
9. Demonstrating the validity of this proposition, RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971) states in part:
§ 1. Reasons for the Rules of Conflict of Laws.
The world is composed of territorial states having separate and dif-
fering systems of law. Events and transactions occur, and issues arise,
that may have a significant relationship to more than one state,
making necessary a special body of rules and methods for their
ordering and resolution....
§ 2. Subject Matter of Conflict of Laws.
Conflict of Laws is that part of the law of each state which deter-
mines what effect is given to the fact the case may have a significant
relationship to more than one state ...
§ 3. State Defined.
As used in the Restatement of this Subject, the word "state" denotes
a territorial unit with a distinct general body of Law. (Emphasis
added.)
See also R. CRAMTON, D. CURRIE, AND H. KAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS, (2d ed.
1975) [hereinafter cited as R. CRAMPTON, D. CURRIE, AND H. KAY] wherein
the following relevant discussion is found:
The world is divided into an inordinate number of neat geographical
boxes: Arkansas, Liechtenstein, the Island of Shina. Each makes its
own laws to govern its own affairs, and each has a system for adjudi-
cating its own disputes. But people, especially within a federal nation,
pay little attention to political boundaries. The California hiker orders
boots from L. L. Bean in Freeport, Maine. The French tourist is mur-
dered by a man from Hoboken, New Jersey, on a Greek ship in Tokyo
harbor. The Pakistani brings two wives to live with him while he
goes to college in Brooklyn. Deciding whose business it is to resolve
disputes arising out of such transactions is the problem we call con-
flict of laws.
Id. at XIII. Note that without a preliminary screening based on territorial
factors, lawyers and judges would have to examine for every case the sub-
stantive rules of all the jurisdictions of the world.
10. See R. CRAMPTON, D. CURRIE, AND H. KAY, note 9 supra, at 15.
19761
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ists found that event or thing at the place of the wrong, the place
of contracting, the situs of property, the domicile of some person,
or the place of trial. ' Modern courts and scholars write as if they
reject territoriality.'2 But the modernists do not abandon territor-
iality; they merely reject the traditional vested rights rules as to
what factor is relevant in applying territoriality. In practice they
have developed a new territoriality, the magic contact almost in-
variably being the residence of a party.'" The search for "the
relevant event or thing" has moved beyond the Restatement of
Law, Conflict of Laws (1934), but the search ought not stop at
residence.
Some criteria are needed to evaluate the utility of whatever
is proposed to serve the territorial imperative in the choice-of-law
process. The event or thing should be legally relevant, of course. Its
territorial home should be relatively easy to establish. It must not
be so metaphysical or transient that it cannot be legally assigned to
one or another political jurisdiction. (But that does not mean it
must be physical, like the spot at which a plane crashes or a con-
tract is signed.) When used in real life, it should produce results
consistent with those past cases whose outcomes have most success-
fully withstood critical examination. Illustrative cases later in this
article demonstrate that legal relationships can meet these terri-
torial criteria.
Legal Relationships and Governmental Interests
Legal relationships universally underlie legal rules, because
each legal rule is designed to affect a kind of legal relationship."
11. See generally RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934).
12. See note 8 supra.
13. See Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d
519 (1969), wherein the court stated:
Michigan has no interest in whether a New York plaintiff is denied
recovery against a New York defendant where the car is insured
here [New York].
Id. at 575, 249 N.E.2d at 398-99, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 525. See also Twerski,
Neumeier v. Kuehner: Where are the Emperor's Clothes?, 1 HoFsTRA L. REV.
104, 107 (1973), wherein it is stated:
In evaluating interests Currie and his academic followers placed
tremendous emphasis on the interest of the domicile state of the parties
in granting or denying recovery .... [Rules] either protected a
domiciliary interest or did not. It was as simple as all that.
Id. at 107.
14. The reader should make this assumption in lieu of what would cer-
tainly be a pedantic and inconclusive marshalling of authority. Reading
[Vol. 10
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Some relationship provides the "target" for every rule of law. In
formulating rules of law, courts and legislatures intend to have
an impact on the interaction between persons. Applying a legal
rule to a situation invariably has consequences to the interrela-
tionships of the legal entities involved.
Throughout his classic work, Fundamental Legal Concep-
tions,"5 Professor Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld used the term "jural
relations" as the generic term for the fundamental legal conceptions
with which he dealt. Professor Walter Wheeler Cook described
Professor Hohfeld's concepts as "the 'lowest common denominators'
in terms of which all legal problems can be stated, and stated so as
to bring out with greater distinctness than would otherwise be
possible the real questions involved.'"" When this central role of
relationships or jural relations in our legal system is recognized,
their significance to the choice of law can be understood.
When a modernist asserts that choices of law must be made
to further the appropriate governmental interests of the jurisdic-
tions involved, he really means that the legal rules and thus the
public policy of the jurisdictions should be asserted only if it is
legitimate to have the rule applied. Since the sovereignty of the
Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied In Judicial Rea-
soning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913), and Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Con-
ception8 As Applied In Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917), will
assist in making the assumption and will suggest the great variety of re-
lationships underlying our rules of law. Hohfeld's view of the applicability of
his concepts of "jural relations" to trust law seems to fit the field of choice
of law as well. He wrote:
Indeed, it would be virtually impossible to consider the subject of
trusts ... at all adequately without, at the very threshold, analyzing
and discriminating the various fundamental conceptions that are in-
volved in practically every legal problem. In this connection the
suggestion may be ventured that the usual discussions of . . . jural
interests seem inadequate (and at times misleading) for the very
reason that they are not founded on a sufficiently comprehensive and
discriminating analysis of jural relations in general. Putting the
matter in another way, the tendency and the fallacy-has been to treat
the specific problem as if it were far less complex than it really is;
and this commendable effort to treat as simple that which is really
complex has, it is believed, furnished a serious obstacle to the clear
understanding, the orderly statement, and the correct solution of legal
problems. In short, it is submitted that the right kind of simplicity can
result only from more discriminating analysis.
W. HonFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS 26 (1919).
15. Id.
16. W. COOK, INTRODUCTION, W. HoHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CON-
CEPTIONS 6 (1919).
1976]
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jurisdiction is territorial - it stops at the state line- there must
be a legitimacy-creating contact of a territorial nature. Thus a
government's interest is to apply the public policy it has adopted to
those relationships which it ought to regulate based on its terri-
torial sovereignty. A jurisdiction's legal rule should be applied
only to regulate a relationship appropriately subject to its sovereign
power. Relationships arising or centered within a jurisdiction are
properly subject to that jurisdiction's rules.
THE SEAT OF THE RELATIONSHIP FORMULA
To utilize the seat of the relationship for choice of law, three
basic problems must be solved. (A) What are the choice-of-law
issues? (B) What is the relevant legal relationship for each issue?
(C) Where should that legal relationship be seated teiritorially?
These may be resolved by a five-step process:
A. To find choice-of-law issues:
1. Identify all jurisdictions which because of territorial con-
nections might be the appropriate source of one or more rules
of law applicable to the case.
2. From these jurisdictions pick out sets of legal rules which
are relevant to the issues of the case and which are diverg-
ent. Recognize that to make a choice of law on each set of
conflicting rules requires a separate decision from the choice
on the other sets.
B. To find the legally relevant relationship for each separate
choice-of-law question:
3. Decide what policy objectives prompted lawmakers to enact
the divergent rules and what relationship they intended
to affect through application of the rules.
C. To match the territorial elements of the case to the identified
relationship:
4. Evaluate each jurisdiction's governmental (policy-making)
interest in affecting the relationship in light of its territorial
connections to the origination or continuation of the relation-
ship and, based on this evaluation, select the most legitimate
jurisdictional seat for the relationship.
D. To choose the appropriate rule from the set of divergent rules:
5. Apply the rule of the jurisdiction in which the identified
relationship has been seated.
[Vol. 10
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The New Restatement and Seat of the Relationship
Having led the law astray with its Conflicts Restatement in
1934, the American Law Institute set out to repair the damage
in the early 1950's. The Second Restatement was promulgated in
1969."7 The basic rule of the new Restatement is that the law of
jurisdiction with the "most significant relationship" to an issue
should be applied.' 8 "Most significant relationship" by itself is an
empty phrase which must pick up meaning from courts and schol-
ars. " ' Written in the midst of the choice-of-law revolution, it is
not surprising that the phrase turned out to be a vague catch-all,
standing for all the modern and semi-modern choice-of-law formu-
lations. With the phrase "most significant relationship," lawyers
and judges have been asked to make sophisticated determinations of
what factual connections to a jurisdiction justify application of its
rule on an issue in conflict. Each lawyer is left in the wilderness20
with little more than a platitude to guide him back to civilization,
although the Restatement does provide some pointers:
17. The reporter for the Restatement Second was Willis L. M. Reese.
Although Professor Reese tried to keep abreast of the conflicts revolution,
each of his redrafts came out a few months too late and met blistering
criticism for not reflecting what courts and scholars had done while the
draft was at the printer. The final draft then came out too soon, before
the finishing touches of the revolution were recorded. The Restatement re-
sembles a chick half out of its shell. It does not restate the law as it was,
as it is, or as it will be.
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971) sets forth the
most significant relationship rule:
§ 145. The General Principle.
(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue
in tort are determined by the local law of the state which, with re-
spect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the occur-
rence and the parties ...
§ 188. Law Governing in Absence of Effective Choice by the Parties.
(1) The rights and duties of the parties with respect to an issue
in contract are determined by the local law of the state which, with
respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the
transaction and the parties. ...
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 145, 188 (1971) (emphasis
added).
19. Cavers calls it "question-begging." D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAW
PROCESS 207 (1965). Ehrenzweig is more cutting. He calls it "nenohilism,"
"meaningless generalization" and "circular," all on one page. A. EHRENZWEIG,
supra note 6, at 351. Weintraub, apparently in praise, says it is a "flexible
tool." R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 6, at 4.
20. Justice Roger Traynor in the introduction to A. EHRENZWEIG,
supra note 6 submits: "In Conflict of Laws the wilderness grows wilder, fast-
er than the axes of discriminating men can keep it under control."
1976]
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(2) Contacts to be taken into account . . . include: (a)
the place the injury occurred, (b) the place the conduct
causing the injury occurred, (c) the domicile, residence,
nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of
the parties, and (d) the place where the relationship, if
any, between the parties is centered.2 '
In one respect, however, the emptiness of the phrase may be
an advantage, because seat of relationship analysis can fit within
it. Lawyers, if they wish, can find the "most significant relation-
ship" by the seat of relationship formula. Particular attention is
directed to clause (d) in the Restatement, 2 which directs attorneys
and judges to an examination of the place where the relationship,
if any, between the parties is centered. In time, this one consider-
ation may swallow the whole ambiguous phrase of the Second Re-
statement. Strengthening this possibility is the obvious failure
of the Restatement reporters to focus their full intellectual energies
on the idea contained in the clause and on its potential ramifica-
tions. This failure becomes obvious considering the two words
"if any." The focus of the reporters was clearly on such special
relationships as host driver-guest passenger, rather than on the
more general relationships such as tortfeasor-victim. But there is
always some relationship between plaintiff and defendant; and if
special relationships are relevant to choice of law, why should not
more universal relationships also be relevant? The question is
rhetorical. Since there is always a relationship underlying con-
flicting rules, clause (d) has universal applicability. Under cross-
examination Professor Reese, the reporter for the Second Re-
statement, would find it impossible to defend inclusion of the
words "if any" in clause (d). At the least, aided by the formula
offered in this article, "the place where the relationship . . . is
centered" provides a convenient way to think about every choice
of law problem.
ILLUSTRATIVE APPLICATIONS OF THE FORMULA
The following illustrations show how the seat-of-the-relation-
ship formula leads to resolution of conflicts problems. To facili-
tate presentation and understanding of the formula, the cases are
presented in groups in which the relevant territorial factors are of
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1971) (em-
phasis added).
22. Regrettably, a parallel to clause (d) does not appear in the contracts
portion of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 (1971).
[Vol. 10
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similar character or in which the analysis requires a particular kind
of flexibility.
Event-Connected Problems
This category includes issues for which the relevant relation-
ship arises from a single occurrence. The justification for applying
the law of the jurisdiction where the relationship originated- that
is, where the event occurred - is that the legislature and courts of
a state cover the territory of the state with an umbrella of public
policy which extends to all events within the state. In this cate-
gory, the rules of law in conflict represent public policy objectives
relating to the particular event, rather than to continuing affilia-
tions, to citizenship, to property, or to court procedures.
The first and second illustrations provide an immediate con-
trast between cases using the seat-of-the-relationship formula and
cases in which courts have been misguided in their use of the gov-
ernmental interest analysis. The courts in these two cases apparent-
ly were so eager to set aside the defects of the old rules that they
missed the continuing significance of territorial factors other than
residences of the parties.
Fabricius v. Horgen."3 Four residents of Iowa were killed in
a head-on collision caused by Horgen, a resident of Iowa but a
stranger to the four victims. The accident occurred in Minnesota.
(1) Iowa and Minnesota have territorial connections to
the case.
(2) The set of rules between which a choice must be
made are:
(a) The Minnesota $25,000 wrongful death statute,
and
(b) The Iowa rule denying any significant recovery
for wrongful death.
(3) These rules, designed to set levels of tort recovery,
are aimed at the relationship of tortfeasor to victim.
(4) This relationship arose and is seated in Minnesota
where these strangers collided.
(5) The Minnesota rule will be applied.
This result is contrary to the result reached by the Iowa
Supreme Court in 1965. Fabricius demonstrates the deficiency of
23. 257 Iowa 268, 132 N.W.2d 410 (1965).
1976]
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a governmental interest analysis which does not include a clear
comprehension of territorial considerations. The Iowa court in
four different places in its opinion recited that "all the parties are
from Iowa."2 4 Elsewhere it asserted: "Minnesota has no conceiv-
able interest in the remedy available. . . ."" But governments
have interests in nonresidents as well as in residents. The United
States Constitution compels states to have interests in nonresidents
as well as in residents. Governments also have interests in events.
Minnesota has a governmental interest in the consequences for all
those affected by the sudden death of four adults on a Minnesota
highway. The Iowa court took too narrow a view of the concerns
of its neighboring state.
The error of the Iowa court is made clearer by playing the
law professors' game of fact-shifting. If the residence of any of
the innocent victims were a jurisdiction other than Iowa, Minne-
sota's rule or one similar to the forum would most likely be applied.2
Similarly, if negligent Horgen hailed from anywhere but Iowa,
Minnesota law would clearly apply to all the claims. Most astound-
ing of all, if the Iowa orphans had brought their action in Minne-
sota, rather than in Iowa, the privileges and immunities clause and
the equal protection clause of the Federal Constitution"7 would have
mandated application of Minnesota law, because the fortuitous
event that these Iowa decedents were killed by another Iowan
would be an inadequate reason for a Minnesota court to deny them
the benefits of Minnesota law as it relates to a Minnesota event.28
Reich v. Purcell." Mrs. Reich, a resident of Ohio, was killed
24. Id. at 270, 276, 278, 132 N.W.2d 411, 415, 416.
25. Id. at 276, 132 N.W.2d at 415.
26. This observation represents a rather cynical but realistic attitude
shared by the authors. That is, under the modern approaches which emphasize
residence, the law of the victims' residence would probably be applied. How-
ever, when confronted with conflicts problems, forum courts often consciously
avoid the morass of conflicts theories and simply apply forum law.
27. "The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and
immunities of citizens of the several states." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. "[N]or
shall any state . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1. See B. CURRIE, supra note 6,
at 445; Currie and Schreter, Unconstitutional Discrimination in the Conflict of
Laws: Privileges and Immunities, 69 YALE L.J. 1323 (1960).
28. See B. CURRIE, supra note 6 wherein the author states:
Yet the moment a state announces that the benefits of its laws will be
reserved exclusively, or even primarily, for its own citizens or resi-
dents, problems of discrimination arise.
Id. at 445.
29. 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967).
(Vol. 10
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in a collision in Missouri caused by the negligence of Purcell, a
resident of California. The parties were strangers to one another.
(1) Ohio, California, and Missouri have territorial con-
nections to the case.
(2) The conflicting rules among which a choice must be
made are:
(a) The Missouri rules establishing a limit on wrong-
ful death damages of $25,000,
(b) the California rule of unlimited damages, and
(c) the Ohio rule of unlimited damages.
(3) These rules, designed to fix levels of tort recovery, are
aimed at the relationship of tortfeasor to victim.
(4) The relationship arose and is seated at the place of
collision in Missouri. There was no prior connection
between the parties.
(5) Missouri's rule will be applied to further its policy of
limited wrongful death claims.
The California court applied Ohio law in this case, based on
the residence of the decedent. It overlooked the territorial factors
actually relevant to the rules in conflict. The case might have been
tried in a Missouri court"° and a Missouri court could not deny to
Purcell, a California resident, the statutory wrongful death limit
which would have been available to a defendant from Missouri in
identical circumstances. The privileges and immunities clause
bars such discrimination based solely on nonresidence."
Negotiation-Connected Problems
A course of negotiations underlies most contract issues. "Ne-
gotiation" is a more useful term for our purposes than "contract"
because many times the issue is whether negotiation results in a
contract obligation. Seating the relationship will also be done
more thoughtfully if the whole course of dealing is examined. This
avoids an old-fashioned focus on the moment at which contract
obligations become fixed. The case that follows illustrates the
point well; the issue is whether there is legal obligation without a
a formal contract.
30. Purcell could have forced trial in Missouri by commencing an action
in Missouri prior to Reich's California suit. The wrongful death claim then
would have become a compulsory counterclaim in the Missouri action.
31. See B. CURRIE, supra note 6, at 445, 524.
19761
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Lowe's North Wilkesboro Hardware, Inc. v. Fidelity Mutual
Life Insurance Co. 2 Decedent, a resident of North Carolina, sought
to purchase from defendant Fidelity $100,000 of life insurance. All
negotiation was carried on in Washington through their respective
agents. The home office of Fidelity in Pennsylvania was slow to
act on decedent's application and he died before other insurance
was obtained.
(1) North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and the District of
Columbia have territorial connections to the case.
(2) The rules among which a choice must be made are:
(a) The North Carolina rule permitting recovery of
damages arising from unreasonable delay in pro-
cessing insurance applications,
(b) the Pennsylvania rule denying recovery of dam-
ages arising from delay in processing applica-
tions, and
(c) an assumed District of Columbia rule denying
recovery of damages from delay. (The court did
not discuss the District rule in its opinion).
(3) The purpose of these rules is to regulate insurance
companies in the promptness with which they act on
applications for insurance. The target relationship
is insurance company to applicant for insurance.
(4) The relationship arose and is seated in the District of
Columbia where the decedent's agent sought out Fi-
delity's agent and negotiated for coverage.
(5) The District rule will be applied to this Washington
business transaction.
The Lowe's court, using the "most significant relationship"
test,3 3 applied Pennsylvania law because that was where the "de-
lay" took place. But the existence or nonexistence of a duty to act
promptly is what must be determined. That duty existed because
of the relationship arising out of the business conversations in
Washington, or it did not exist at all.
Affiliation-Connected Problems
The modern approach to conflicts provides an escape from tra-
ditional error on choice-of-law issues where a legally relevant re-
32. 319 F.2d 469 (4th Cir. 1963).
33. Id. at 474.
[Vol. 10
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lationship preexists the tort or contract transaction giving rise
to the cause of action. While the new conflicts theory permits
courts to give appropriate significance to these preexistent rela-
tionships, it has not provided the analytical guidance required for
consistently logical results. The seat-of-relationship formula re-
quires the lawyer to focus on the various relationships in the fol-
lowing multiple relationship cases.
Alabama Great Southern Railroad Co. v. Carroll." Carroll
lived in Alabama where he was hired by the defendant railroad
to serve as brakeman on trains running in Alabama and Missis-
sippi. He was injured on the job in Mississippi.
(1) Mississippi and Alabama have territorial connections
to the case.
(2) The rules in conflict are:
(a) The Mississippi rule denying employer liability
for fellow servant negligence, and
(b) the Alabama employers' liability act imposing
liability.
(3) The policy objective of these rules is to define the
legal liabilities running between employers and em-
ployees in cases of fellow servant injuries. The em-
ployer-employee is the target relationship affected by
application of the rule.
(4) The employer-employee relationship in this case arose
and is seated in Alabama where the employee was
hired, was paid, and worked.
(5) The Alabama rule will be applied to further the Ala-
bama policy of employer compensation for on-the-job
injury.
The result is contrary to the original case, which has been a fa-
vorite target of those attacking the vested rights theory. The
case illustrates one facet of the proposition that preexisting rela-
tionships often condition the obligations arising from a later event.
Here an employer-employee relationship was formed. There was
no intention in the formation of that relationship that employee
Carroll should be injured by accident, although such injury was
certainly foreseeable. When the foreseeable but unintended in-
jury occurred, the employer's liability arose from the employment
34. 97 Ala. 125, 11 So. 803 (1892).
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relationship and the rules of law relating thereto, rather than from
the general law applicable to torts.
Haumschild v. Continental Casualty Co." Mr. Haumschild
drove negligently in California, injuring his wife. They live in
Wisconsin.
(1) California and Wisconsin have territorial connections
to the case.
(2) The rules between which a choice must be made are:
(a) the California rule of interspousal immunity, and
(b) the Wisconsin rule permitting actions between
spouses.
(3) The policy objective of the rules is to regulate, as each
state believes necessary, the assertion of legal claims
by one spouse against another in order to promote
marital harmony. The marital relationship is the tar-
get of the rules.
(4) This relationship is seated at the marital domicile
in Wisconsin.
(5) Wisconsin's rule will be applied.
Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines.6 Kilberg was killed in a plane
crash in Massachusetts. He lived in New York and purchased his
ticket there.
(1) New York and Massachusetts have territorial connec-
tions to the case.
(2) The conflicting rules of law between which a choice
must be made are:
(a) The Massachusetts $15,000 wrongful death limi-
tation, and
(b) the New York rule placing no maximum on
wrongful death recoveries.
(3) The policy objective of the rules is to regulate recov-
ery in cases of wrongful death. The relationship af-
fected is the relationship of carrier to passenger,
which is the source of the liability.
85. 7 Wis. 2d 130, 45 N.W.2d 814 (1959).
36. 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961).
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(4) The relationship between Kilberg and the airline
arose from Kilberg's arrangement of the trip in New
York. It is seated there.
(5) New York's rule will be applied to further its policy
of full compensation for death.
The ticket office should not be treated mechanically as the
seat of the relationship. The relationship of carrier to passenger
probably should be seated at the passenger's place of business for
business trips and at the passenger's residence for pleasure trips.
Neither chance nor manipulation can then affect choice of law.
The advertising inducements of airlines reach into home and
office, so seating the relationship in this way is not unfair to
airlines.
A parallel exists between the Kilberg case and the Carroll
case. In Carroll, the affiliation relationship arose from employment;
in Kilberg, the affiliation arose from the purchase of an airline
ticket. In each case injury was not an intended consequence, but
injury was foreseeable. When the foreseeable injury occurred, the
obligations arising from that injury differed from the obligations
which would have existed independent of the employment or the
contract of carriage. For example, had the airplane in which Ki-
berg perished crashed into an interstate bus, killing bus passen-
gers from a number of states, the airline liability arising from
those deaths would be measured by the law of the place of the
crash. No preexisting relationship between the airline and bus
passengers would exist to make the law of any other jurisdiction
legally relevant.
Palmer v. Fisher.' A businessman from Illinois made dis-
closures in Illinois to his accountant. The disclosed information
subsequently became relevant to an action in Florida.
(1) Illinois and Florida have territorial connections to
the case.
(2) The rules between which a choice must be made are:
(a) The rule of Illinois that communications to an ac-
countant are privileged, and
(b) the rule of Florida that communications to an ac-
countant are not privileged.
(3) The objective of the rule of privilege is to encourage
full disclosure between a client and his business coun-
37. 288 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 965 (1956).
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selors. The rule is directed at the relationship be-
tween client and accountant in a similar manner as
the rule of attorney-client privilege is directed at the
relationship between lawyers and clients.
(4) The relationship arose and is seated in Illinois where
accountant and client maintain their businesses.
(5) The privilege rule of Illinois will be applied to further
its policy of full disclosure to business counselors.
To be effective in its "substantive" purpose of encouraging
communications between clients and accountants, the privilege
must be secure from attack in foreign courts. The Palmer court ar-
rived at this appropriate result by dubious substance-procedure
characterization.
Most rules of law affect an obligation in one way or another
-its existence, size, duration, offsets, or limitations. Therefore,
most rules relevant to a case affect some relationship or obligation
between plaintiff and defendant. The rule of privilege is unusual
in that it does not relate to the liability of defendant to plaintiff,
but serves an independent purpose. This case and its privilege rule
illustrate that the relevant relationship is not always one between
the plaintiff and the defendant.
Intermediary-Connected Problems
In many cases the plaintiff and the defendant do not have
direct contact, but rather come into a legal relationship involving
liability through a third party. The intermediary may have con-
tact with the plaintiff in one state and with the defendant in an-
other. A choice-of-law issue arises when one involved jurisdiction
has a rule which imposes liability while another involved jurisdic-
tion imposes no liability, lesser liability, or liability upon a different
theory.
The first step toward resolution of the conflict is to decide
whether the rule favoring the claimant is primarily a rule to pro-
vide compensation or primarily a rule to deter wrongful conduct.
A rule for compensation takes precedence over a no-recovery or
lesser-recovery rule when the victim is injured in the jurisdiction
promulgating the rule for compensation. The policy of compen-
sation should apply only if the victim is under the umbrella of
compensatory law when the injury occurs. On the other hand,
a rule designed to punish a defendant for wrongful conduct
should be imposed only if the defendant's conduct occurred in the
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jurisdiction promulgating the deterring rule. The policy objectives
of a rule designed to deter are connected to the place of acting."
Hunter v. Derby Foods." Dean purchased a can of unwhole-
some corned beef in Ohio and died there after eating it. Derby, a
New York distributor, had purchased the canned meat in Argen-
tina. The meat was resold in Ohio to a wholesaler, then to the
retailer from whom Dean made his purchase.
(1) Argentina, New York, and Ohio have territorial connec-
tions with the case.
(2) The rules between which a choice must be made are:
(a) The assumed rule of Argentina that food distributors
are liable only for negligently selling unwholesome
food,
(b) the similar rule of New York, and
(c) the Ohio rule of strict liability for selling unwhole-
some food.
(3) The policy of the jurisdiction where the injury occurred
is to insure compensation when a relationship of victim
to manufacturer or seller exists. That relationship is af-
fected by application of the rule.
38. At first it may seem that a compensatory rule of the jurisdiction in
which the injury occurs will always be applied. The victim is entitled to the
umbrella of policy of wherever he is when injury occurs. But consider this
exception: Jones, a resident of Indiana, buys spoiled meat in Indiana from an
Indiana meat packer whose entire business is located in Indiana, operating
and existing pursuant to Indiana Laws. When Jones subsequently drives to
Ohio and eats the spoiled meat, he suffers injury.
It is important to note that the place of sale and the place of injury are
different. Ohio, the jurisdiction where the injury occurred, has a rule of
strict liability for the sale of spoiled meat evidencing a policy of compensa-
tion. Indiana, the jurisdiction where the meat packer's business activities are
centered, has a rule of deterrence imposing liability only where negligence is
found. It may seem that Ohio strict liability law would apply since Jones
was under the umbrella of Ohio compensatory law when the injury occurred.
But this is not the correct result. The rules in conflict are designed to affect
the relationship of manufacturer to victim. That relationship originated
in Indiana where the sale was made. The relationship was preexisting or
continuous when the injury fortuitously occurred in Ohio. Seat of rela-
tionship recognizes preexisting relationships as a valid factor in choice of
law. Thus it is fairer to apply the law of Indiana, the state where the
ongoing relationship had its inception and where the meat packer conducts
his business.
39. 110 F.2d 970 (2d Cir. 1940).
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(4) This relationship, underlying a rule of liability without
fault, arose and is seated in Ohio where the injury was
suffered.
(5) The strict liability rule of Ohio will be applied.
The Hunter case illustrates a principle applicable to product
liability cases. If liability at the place of injury is based on strict
liability, that rule should be applied regardless of the rule at the
place of manufacture. A manufacturer sending products into a strict
liability state should not have less liability exposure there than
other businesses because of its home state rule of more limited
responsibility. On the other hand, if the state of injury bases
liability oi negligent manufacture (fault), a rule of compensatory
liability at the place of manufacture should not be applied. This
is because the policy where the injury occurs is not so strict. The
policy seeks only to deter careless manufacture. To export a strict
liability rule along with the products of a jurisdiction would impose
an inequitable burden on that state's businesses.
Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel."' The Driscoll Hotel, managers of
the Hookum Cow Bar, illegally sold drinks in Minnesota to Sorenson
who was obviously drunk. Sorenson and Schmidt then drove into
Wisconsin where an accident occurred as a result of Sorenson's
drunken driving. Schmidt was injured and sued the Minnesota
bar under Minnesota's dram shop act.
(1) Wisconsin and Minnesota have territorial connections
to the case.
(2) The rules in conflict are:
(a) Minnesota's dram shop act holding bars liable for
injury suffered as a result of illegal liquor sales, and
(b) Wisconsin's rule of no dram shop liability.
(3) The place of injury imposes no liability and the place
of the jurisdiction where the illegal sale took place has
as its policy the imposition of liability to deter bar oper-
ators from such sales. The relationship at which the rules
are directed is that between the bar and the victim of its
drunken patron.
(4) The relationship, underlying a rule designed to deter
illegal sales, arose and is seated in Minnesota at the place
of the illegal sale.
40. 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d 365 (1957).
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(5) Minnesota's rule will be applied.
Since the liability is premised on wrongful conduct, the illegal
sale is the more significant territorial contact. This reasoning
holds up when the facts are transposed. If the sale were made
in Wisconsin and the injury were suffered in Minnesota, liability
based on the Minnesota dram shop act should not be imposed on
the Wisconsin bar.
Williams v. Rawlings Truck Lines, Inc." Goldberger sold a car
to Rivera in New York, but failed to remove the license plates as
required by New York law. Rivera took the car to the District of
Columbia where his negligent driving injured Williams, a resident
of New Jersey. Williams joins Goldberger as a defendant.
(1) New York, New Jersey, and the District of Columbia
have territorial connections to the case.
(2) The rules between which a choice must be made are:
(a) The New York rule that one who sells a motor
vehicle continues to be liable as owner of the
vehicle until his New York plates are removed
from the car,
(b) the District of Columbia rule that actual sale
of a vehicle terminates the owner's liability, and
(c) the New Jersey rule which is the same as the Dis-
trict of Columbia rule.
(3) The peculiar New York rule is designed to deter
evasions of its compulsory auto insurance law. The
relationship it is aimed at is the relationship of an
uninsured car owner and the victim of his negli-
gence. If Rivera continued to be a New York resident
after purchasing the car, he was an evader of the
mandatory insurance law, and the target relationship
was present in this case.
(4) The relationship arose in New York where Goldberger
committed the prohibited act of transferring his car
without removing the registration plates. It is ap-
propriate to seat the relationship there to further the
purpose of the rule.
(5) New York law will be applied.
41. 357 F.2d 581 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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This case sharply defines the governmental interest foundation
for the seat-of-the-relationship formula. Discussion of this case
by conflicts commentators purporting to embrace the governmen-
tal interest analysis is surprisingly deficient in not asking the ob-
vious question: why did New York require the owner to remove
the plates from an automobile he sold? The formula compels that
question. Once that relevant question is asked, a logical resolution
of the case is within reach.
Residence-Connected Problems
Each person carries with him a number of legal statuses, e.g.,
taxpayer, voter, candidate, spouse, parent, child, which his home
jurisdiction may have a policy interest in affecting. Technical domi-
cile was over-emphasized by the old conflicts rules and residence
now is over-emphasized by the new conflicts cases. Nonetheless,
home is a valid basis for choice of law on many issues.
White v. Tennat.4" After a lifetime spent in West Virginia,
decedent moved to Pennsylvania. Fifteen days after the move he
died. His widow immediately moved back to West Virginia to live
with her family. Decedent's brothers and sisters are also West
Virginia residents.
(1) Pennsylvania and West Virginia have territorial con-
nections to the case.
(2) The rules between which a choice must be made are:
(a) The intestacy rule of Pennsylvania giving fifty
percent of the estate to a widow without chil-
dren and fifty percent to collateral heirs, and
(b) the West Virginia intestacy rule giving one hun-
dred percent to the widow.
(3) The policy of the conflicting rules is to determine the
appropriate apportionment of an intestate decedent's
estate among his heirs. The target relationship is
heir to heir.
(4) The decedent is central to this legal problem. In light
of his insignificant connections with Pennsylvania
it is appropriate to seat the relationship in West Vir-
ginia, the jurisdiction of his more dominant residence.
(5) The intestacy rule of West Virginia will be applied
to further its public policy of distribution of estate
assets among relatives.
42. 31 W. Va. 790, 8 S.E. 596 (1888).
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This result is inconsistent with the actual decision in the
White case, which has been criticized by most commentators as
foolish, mechanical and unjust. If the Pennsylvania connections
with the decedent were to be increased bit-by-bit, a point would
be reached at which the seat of the relationship should shift from
West Virginia to Pennsylvania. At that hard-to-determine point
the seat of the relationship becomes Pennsylvania and the rule of
intestate succession for Pennsylvania is more appropriate than the
rule of West Virginia. A case should become more difficult as
the facts become more mixed and inconclusive. One objective of
the seat-of-the-relationship formula is to allow for legitimate
doubt, confusion, and dissent in the borderline case, rather than
pretending a mechanical rule can give an automatic and easy
answer. Another objective of the formula is to achieve, in an
easy case like White, a just result as simply as the facts of the given
case warrant.
In re Barrie's Estate.4' Decedent executed a will in 1928 in
Illinois. She died in 1944, having been a resident of Illinois
throughout the period after the will was executed. Upon her
death the will was found with the word "void" written across its
face. Decedent's estate included land in Iowa.
(1) Illinois and Iowa have territorial connections to the
case.
(2) The conflicting rules between which a choice must be
made are:
(a) The Illinois rule invalidating a will when the
testator writes "void" across its face, and
(b) the Iowa rule holding that a will is not cancelled
by the word "void."
(3) The policy objectives of the conflicting rules are to in-
terpret the intent of a testator in taking action which
might or might not represent revocation of a will.
The target relationship is intestacy heirs to benefici-
aries under the will.
(4) The decedent is central to this legal problem, so the
relationship should be seated at her home in Illinois.
(5) Illinois law will be applied to further its policy of
allowing its residents to cancel wills by writing
"void."
43. 240 Iowa 78, 182 N.W. 227 (1921).
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In the Barrie case, the Iowa court held that the will was
void as to all estate assets-except the Iowa land. By giving undue
credence to the idea that the jurisdiction wherein the land is situ-
ated should have its law applied to the disposition of that land,
the Iowa court produced an anomalous result with respect to the
overall validity of the will.
Grant v. McAuliffe." Plaintiff and Pullen collided in Ari-
zona. Both were residents of California, but strangers to one an-
other. After the accident Pullen died.
(1) Arizona and California have territorial connections
to the case.
(2) The rules of law between which a choice must be made
are:
(a) The Arizona rule that a tort action may not be
brought against the estate of a decedent, and
(b) the California rule that such actions may be
maintained.
(3) The purpose of the Arizona rule is to protect estate
assets for more deserving beneficiaries than tort
claimants. The rule is aimed at the relationship be-
tween the tort claimant and others claiming the assets
in Pullen's estate.
(4) The seat of this relationship is in California where
the relationships connected with Pullen's estate arose.
It is California where Pullen had resided and where
his estate is being administered.
(5) California's rule will be applied to further its policy
of compensating legitimate tort claimants out of the
estates of residents.
Of course Grant was seeking payment from an auto insurer.
Since he was not seeking recovery out of Pullen's general estate
assets, the relationship which should be present to make the Ari-
zona rule applicable is not present in the facts of this case. The
rule of non-survival of tort actions is inappropriate in auto insur-
ance cases. Its application in such cases is a defect of Arizona law.
Courts, however, should not manipulate choice of law to avoid the
bad laws of Arizona or any other state.
44. 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953).
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In the Matter of the Estate of Sendonas."5 Decedent was pre-
deceased by two brothers and a sister in Greece. The two brothers
had natural children surviving while the sister was survived by an
adopted child. Decedent, domiciled in Washington at death, owned
land in Washington.
(1) Greece and Washington have territorial connections
to the case.
(2) The rules between which a choice must be made are:
(a) The rule of Washington that adopted children
inherit from collateral heirs as do natural chil-
dren, and
(b) the rule of Greece that adopted children cannot
inherit from collateral heirs of the adopting par-
ent.
(3) The policy of the conflicting rules relates to the role
of an adopted child in the extended family. The tar-
get relationship is that of family member with other
family members.
(4) This relationship is seated in Greece where the
adopted child was added to the family by adoption and
where the family lived.
(5) The rule of Greece will be applied.
This result is contrary to the actual Sendonas decision. The
Washington court applied the situs-of-property rule to decree
Washington land in a manner consistent with the Washington
adoption rule. The purpose of the Greek rule is to protect the
claims of inheritance by members of the family against the claims
of someone brought into the family through adoption. The poten-
tial for mischief involves the family, not the property. The home
jurisdiction of the family should make the policy judgment of
whether it prefers the benefit of extending the status of full fam-
ily membership to adopted children or prefers to avoid the risk
of mischievous adoption. The facts of this case could be reversed
to put the family in Washington and the land in Greece. The more
modern Washington adoption rule then would apply under the seat-
of-the-relationship theory, but not under the reasoning of the
Sendonas court. The Sendonas facts are instructive, because they
demonstrate that the search is for the appropriate rule, not the
"better" rule.
45. 62 Wash. 2d 129, 381 P.2d 752 (1963).
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Property-Connected Problems
It is only a matter of time until the conflicts revolution over-
turns the situs rule applied in Sendonas and traditionally applied
to property cases. But there will be a few issues for which the
location of the property should determine the applicable rules.
Sherman v. Estey Organ Co."6 Sherman was mortgagee of
New Hampshire land. The mortgage, executed in Vermont, con-
formed to Vermont law but did not contain language required by
New Hampshire law. A New Hampshire statute made a mortgage
without the prescribed language void "against any person except
the mortgagor." The Estey Organ Co., under a bill of sale from
Sherman's mortgagor, claimed title to lumber from the land in an
action in Vermont.
(1) Vermont and New Hampshire have territorial con-
nections to the case.
(2) The rules between which a choice must be made are:
(a) The rule of Vermont validating the form of mort-
gage recorded in this case, and
(b) the rule of New Hampshire that for a mortgage
of record to be valid notice to good faith pur-
chasers, it must contain the omitted language.
(3) The policy objective of the New Hampshire rule is to
preserve the consistency of its land records. The tar-
get of the rule is the relationship between competing
claimants to an interest in the land.
(4) The relationship is seated in New Hampshire where
the land and the title records are located.
(5) New Hampshire's rule will be applied to further its
policy on recording of mortgages.
Procedure-Connected Problems
Traditionally problems involving court procedures have been
resolved by characterizing the issue as one of procedure to be de-
termined by forum law. 4" Because the characterization was made
issue by issue, traditional practice produced reasonably satifactory
results consistent with a seat-of-the-relationship analysis.
46. 69 Vt. 355, 38 A. 70 (1897).
47. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 584-625 (1934). The procedural
classification was also used, or misused, as an escape from the rigid vested
rights rules. See B. CURRIE, supra note 6, at 128.
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Levy v. Steiger."8 Levy and Steiger, residents of Massachu-
setts, collided in Rhode Island. Levy brought a negligence action
in Massachusetts.
(1) Massachusetts and Rhode Island have territorial con-
nections to the case.
(2) The rules between which a choice must be made are:
(a) The Massachusetts rule that a defendant relying
on contributory negligence has the burden to
prove the negligence of the plaintiff, and
(b) the Rhode Island rule that a plaintiff must af-
firmatively prove he was free of negligence.
(3) The two rules represent divergent policies on how best
to discover facts in a court trial. The relationship
underlying these rules is the relationship of litigant
to litigant.
(4) The relationship is seated in Massachusetts where
the court sits.
(5) The Massachusetts rule will be applied so as not to im-
pose the Rhode Island technique of fact finding upon
a Massachusetts court.
Double-Purpose Rules
Sometimes a rule of law has two or more distinct objectives.
The goal may be to affect different relationships. The separate
target relationships may turn out to be territorially centered in
different jurisdictions. The following illustrations show how the
formula can be adjusted to this complexity.
Leroux v. Brown.' Brown contracted in France to work for
Leroux for longer than one year. He did not perform, but returned
to England. Leroux brings an action for damages in England.
(1) England and France have territorial connections to
the case.
(2) The rules between which a choice must be made are:
(a) The English rule that employment contracts
which cannot be performed within a year must
be in writing, and
(b) the French rule that no writing is required.
48. 233 Mass. 600, 124 N.E. 477 (1919).
49. 13 C.B. 801, 824, 138 Eng. Rep. 1119, 1129 (1852).
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(3) The statute of frauds has two purposes. The first is
a "substantive" purpose to increase commercial cer-
tainty by requiring written contracts. The business
relationship between the parties underlies the rule in
this aspect. The second purpose is to protect courts
from perjuries. The relationship of litigant to litigant
underlies the rule in this procedural aspect.
(4) The business relationship is seated in France where
negotiation for the employment occurred and where
the work was to be done. The litigant to litigant rela-
tionship is seated in England where the court sits.
(5) The validity of the contract will be determined by
French law so as to further French policy of enforc-
ing obligations. The English court will further its
procedural policy by dismissing the action procedur-
ally-without prejudice to an action by Leroux to en-
force his substantively valid claim in some court
less sensitive to the hazards of perjury.
This result is consistent with the original case, in which there
was a non-suit without prejudice.
Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Co., Ltd.'* Bournias was a
Panamanian employed on a Panamanian ship. Under the Panama
Labor Code he became entitled to exemplary payments from the
ship owner. More than a year after his entitlement, he brought
an action in a United States district court in New York.
(1) The United States and Panama have territorial con-
nections to the case.
(2) The rules between which a choice must be made are:
(a) The Panama one-year statute of limitations, and
(b) the longer statute of limitations of United States
admiralty law.
(3) The statute of limitations has two purposes directed
at different relationships. The first is a "substantive"
purpose to give legal peace from obligations of the
past. The relationship which calls the rule into the
case for this purpose is employer to employee. The
second is a "procedural" purpose-to protect the
court from stale disputes. The relationship of litigant
to litigant underlies the statute of limitations in this
objective.
50. 220 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1955).
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(4) The employer-employee relationship arose and is
seated in Panama, where the duty which was
breached arose. The litigant-to-litigant relationship
is seated in the United States where the admiralty
court sits.
(5) The Panama statute will be applied to give the ship
owner substantive peace from the "ancient" obliga-
tion as intended by Panama's public policy.
The Bournias court actually applied the longer forum statute
to revive a barred claim. This frustrated Panama's policy of peace
after a year. When the forum statute of limitations is shorter, a
claim within its bar should be dismissed without prejudice. This
furthers the procedural objective of avoiding stale claims, while
not precluding assertion of the substantively valid claim in a court
not so sensitive to older claims.
CONCLUSION
The choice-of-law field is now and has been in a dismal state.5'
Scholars continue to propose theories too complex for courts, pra-
titioners and fellow scholars. The usually helpful American Law
Institute in the Second Restatement has offered an empty phrase.
Ironically, the Second Restatement contains a full chapter on tech-
nical rules for determination and application of domicile,52 which
are irrelevant if the phrase "most significant relationship" is to
be the test.
The seat-of-relationship formula proposed in this article is
offered in the hope that it avoids both oversimplification and pe-
dantic sophistication. By describing step-by-step what questions
to think about, it may lead lawyers to sensible conclusions. In
time, cases decided (and explained) on the basis of the formula
should produce precedents which will provide guides for expanded
use of the formula. This article, we hope, is a start toward ra-
tional analysis.
51. Professor William Prosser characterized conflicts scholarship with
his usual candor:
The realm of conflict laws is a dismal swamp filled with quaking
quagmires, and inhabited by learned but eccentric professors who
theorize about mysterikus matters in a strange and incomprehensible
jargon. The ordinary court, or lawyer is quite lost when engulfed
and entangled in it.
Prosser, Interstate Publication, 51 MICH. L. REv. 959, 971 (1953).
52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAws Chap. 2 (1971).
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